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ABSTRACT—This Essay considers whether the government can force
a person to decrypt his computer. The only courts to consider the issue
limited their analyses to rote application of predigital doctrine and dicta.
This is a mistake; courts should instead aim to maintain the ex ante
equilibrium of privacy and government power. This approach—seeking
equilibrium—was just endorsed by the Supreme Court in Riley v.
California, a recent Fourth Amendment case. Yet Riley’s rationale also
extends to the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, and
maintaining equilibrium there requires permitting forced decryption.
Because current doctrine can be interpreted as allowing forced decryption,
courts should adopt that interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seeks equilibrium.1 When new
technology frustrates the government’s ability to obtain evidence, “the
Supreme Court generally adopts lower Fourth Amendment protections . . .
to help restore the status quo ante level of government power.”2
Conversely, when new technology “makes evidence substantially easier for
the government to obtain, the Supreme Court often embraces higher
protections to help restore the prior level of privacy protection.”3 One need
not search far back to find equilibrium-seeking in action—see Riley v.
California,4 a recent Supreme Court decision on the Fourth Amendment
and cell phones.
Yet equilibrium-seeking is not confined to that Amendment. In the
Fifth Amendment, too, the Court seeks equilibrium. Throughout SelfIncrimination Clause jurisprudence, one finds the Court balancing privacy
against the government’s need to obtain evidence.5
Enter: encrypted data and the compelled production thereof, an area in
want of equilibrium. Previously, when the government obtained a warrant
for data, it got that data. But now when the sought data is encrypted, the
government instead gets a password prompt. If that password is strong, the
computer is, in Riley’s words, “all but ‘unbreakable.’”6 This leaves the
government with just one option: obtaining a subpoena to force the person
to enter her password and thereby decrypt the data. But does the Fifth
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause bar this forced decryption?

1 See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011).
2 Id. at 480.
3 Id.
4 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
5 Dan Terzian, The Fifth Amendment, Encryption, and the Forgotten State Interest, 61 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 298, 307–09 (2014) (collecting cases).
6 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486; see also Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and
Keys, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 175; Simson Garfinkel, The iPhone Has Passed a Key Security
Threshold, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/
428477/the-iphone-has-passed-a-key-security-threshold/ [http://perma.cc/5469-AMZL].
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Lower courts have not yet sought, nor even considered, equilibrium in
answering this question.7 The only federal appeals court ruling on the issue
essentially held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits forced decryption.8
There goes the government’s ability to obtain digital evidence in that
circuit.
This is a mistake. Courts should begin seeking equilibrium in their
Fifth Amendment analyses. Riley itself, even though a Fourth Amendment
case, signals courts to do so. The Riley Court sought equilibrium, and its
decision tells lower courts to do similarly—to “feel free to read Supreme
Court precedents narrowly” in other cases involving new technologies.9
Encryption is such a new technology; it vitiates the government’s ability to
gather evidence. Paper documents—even if locked in a safe—can be
recovered;10 an encrypted computer’s documents cannot. Maintaining
equilibrium here requires permitting forced decryption, and SelfIncrimination Clause precedent can be interpreted as permitting it. Courts
should therefore adopt that interpretation.
This Essay first introduces Self-Incrimination Clause doctrine apart
from any equilibrium analysis in Part I. In Part II, it then discusses Riley
and its equilibrium-seeking. And last, Part III argues that Riley supports
finding forced decryption constitutional.
I.

THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE

The Self-Incrimination Clause declares that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”11 The
privilege against self-incrimination, where applicable, gives persons the
right to refuse the government’s demands for information, data, or
objects.12 The privilege applies wherever the government (1) compels (2) a
testimonial communication or act that (3) is incriminating.13 In practice, the
analysis focuses only on the element of testimonial communications or acts
because the other two elements’ existence or nonexistence is “obvious.”14

7 Terzian, supra note 5, at 300 & n.3; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012); Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512 (2014).
8 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346–49.
9 Richard Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26,
2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourthamendment [http://perma.cc/W4D-PE2D].
10 Terzian, supra note 5, at 310.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984).
13 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1341.
14 See id.
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Communications or acts can be testimonial for two independent
reasons: because they convey an implied communication or because they
require substantial mental effort. Implied communications arise from
producing documents. If you, say, produce files from a specific computer,
you are implying that you possess or control that computer.15 This
production can be testimonial and therefore barred by the Fifth
Amendment.16
Implied communications pose no real concern to forced decryption’s
constitutionality for two reasons. First, the government can compel the
production if it provides act-of-production immunity. This “immuniz[es]
the testimonial component of the act”—the government cannot use it to
prove ownership—but it lets the government use the data obtained from the
computer to prove anything else.17
Second, the government may be able to compel production through
the “foregone conclusion” exception. Where the government can
“independently confirm” the testimonial component (here, computer
ownership) through specific “prior knowledge” that goes beyond mere
suspicion, it can still compel production.18 So when the government finds a
desktop computer in Winston’s unshared studio apartment, that computer’s
password prompt lists the user as “Winston,” and the only fingerprints on
the computer are Winston’s, his ownership is likely a foregone conclusion
and the files’ production can be compelled.19
Contrast implied communications with the stronger reason why forced
decryption could be viewed as testimonial: through substantial mental
effort. Compelled acts requiring substantial mental effort are testimonial,
while those requiring little are not.20 Note that the foregone conclusion
exception applies here, too—if the government seeks a specific document

15 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2000); Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 57–59 (1986).
16 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36–37; Nicholas Soares, Note, The Right to Remain Encrypted: The
Self-Incrimination Doctrine in the Digital Age, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 2001, 2004–05 (2012).
17 See, e.g., Alito, supra note 15, at 57; Reitinger, supra note 6, at 189–91, 196–200 (noting
contrary authority in limited circumstances not relevant here).
18 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45. See generally Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, Decrypting the Fifth
Amendment: The Limits of Self-Incrimination in the Digital Era, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY 11 (2012) (examining the foregone conclusion doctrine’s application to digital data and
proposing a new analytical framework).
19 Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346–49 (finding the implicit and explicit factual
communications in that case were not foregone conclusions).
20 Terzian, supra note 5, at 304; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (“[H]is
Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated because nothing he has said or done is deemed to be
sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege.” (emphasis added)).
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and knows it is on your computer, the exception applies regardless of the
mental effort involved.21
Consider the following examples of testimonial communications
through mental effort. Producing handwriting or voice samples requires
relatively little mental effort—just, basically, commanding yourself to
write or speak—so compelling their production is not testimonial and thus
is permissible.22 But responding to a subpoena seeking documents spanning
eleven broad categories and amounting to over 13,000 responsive pages?
That requires substantial mental effort and is therefore testimonial.23
Now, which example do you think forced decryption (compelling a
person to enter a password) is more like: writing some words or mining box
after box for responsive documents? Me too. This is how current doctrine
can be interpreted as permitting forced decryption.
To be sure, this interpretation is more nuanced at the margins. Maybe,
for instance, Julia does not remember her password and relearning it
requires finding its various components stowed in numerous boxes. Even
here, though, forced decryption still does not require substantial mental
effort. Julia does not need to analyze a subpoena and make judgments
about whether certain documents are responsive.24 Rather, she knows
exactly what she needs to do—physically compile the password’s
components and then decrypt her computer—with no judgments being
necessary.
Courts have not yet framed the issue this way.25 The Eleventh Circuit,
the only federal appeals court on point, found forced decryption
testimonial.26 Its analysis hinged on a line of Supreme Court dicta: the
production of strongbox keys can be compelled, but combinations to a safe
cannot.27 Because computer passwords are more like combinations than
keys, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a password’s production is
testimonial.28 It then concluded that forced decryption is also testimonial

21 E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346–49; see also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45; cf.
Dan Terzian, Forced Decryption as a Foregone Conclusion, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 27 (2015)
(discussing the two competing frameworks for determining what constitutes a foregone conclusion in
the context of encrypted data).
22 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35.
23 See id. at 40–43.
24 Cf. id. at 42–43 (finding that it was “unquestionably necessary” for respondent to make
judgments about which documents were responsive to a subpoena).
25 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
26 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346.
27 See id.; see also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
28 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346.
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because using a decryption password requires substantial mental effort, as
it’s also more like producing a combination than a key.29
This reasoning falters twice. First, it misreads Supreme Court dicta.
The dicta regards only compelling production: the government can compel
the production of keys but not the production of combinations.30 It is silent
on whether the government can compel unlocking (i.e., forcing a person to
enter a combination without producing a copy). This silence, coupled with
the dicta’s rationale, suggests that compelled unlocking may be
constitutional. The reason for the Court’s distinguishing between key and
combination productions stems from the Court’s concern over compelled
creation. Combinations may not exist outside a person’s mind, so
producing them would require compelling the creation of a physical
version, and it is this compelled creation that makes the response
testimonial.31 There are no such compelled creation concerns with
compelled unlocking through forced decryption—the data is already there,
the person just needs to unlock it, and unlocking it does not require creating
a physical copy of the password.
The second stumble comes in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of
mental effort. Entering an oft-used password requires no more mental effort
than finding a key.32 You remember the key’s location and then find it, just
as you remember the password and then input it.
Put aside the relative merits of these competing interpretations—mine
and the Eleventh Circuit’s; they matter little here. Instead, just accept that
the interpretation permitting forced decryption is theoretically possible
under current Fifth Amendment doctrine, even if you think it improbable.
Here is why lower courts should nevertheless adopt the improbable
interpretation and permit forced decryption: Riley v. California.
II. EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING IN RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
To start, Riley is not a Fifth Amendment case. Instead it is a Fourth
Amendment case, raising the question of whether the government can
search a person’s cellphone incident to arrest. The answer: Not without a
warrant.33

29

See id.
See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43; Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988).
31 Mohan & Villasenor, supra note 18, at 13–14; Terzian, supra note 5, at 305.
32 Terzian, supra note 5, at 310–11.
33 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485, 2493, 2494–95 (2014) (noting exigent circumstances
that may permit a search without a warrant).
30
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That answer is not terribly important for forced decryption cases.
What is important, however, are two principles Riley articulates that apply
broadly to criminal procedure jurisprudence. But before discussing those
principles, let me allay any initial concerns: It matters not that Riley regards
the Fourth Amendment and forced decryption regards the Fifth. In both
areas, “the Court zigs, zags, and balances, ad hoc” in an attempt to seek
equilibrium.34 Moreover, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that
“[t]he values protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . substantially overlap
[with] those [that] the Fifth Amendment helps to protect.”35 Because Riley
essentially regards computers and touches upon encryption’s
impenetrability, that overlap is twofold here.
Now on to Riley’s two core principles. First, Riley thrice signals that
there should be computer rules of criminal procedure, just as there are
vehicle rules.36 First by declaring that many cellphones “are in fact
minicomputers”;37 second by distinguishing these minicomputers from
other objects kept on the person;38 and third by declaring that searching
minicomputers cannot be analogized to other searches incident to arrest.39
On distinguishing computers, the Court recognized that cellphones are
“qualitatively different” from other objects people carry.40 The details they
contain about “the privacies of life” are so vast that they “implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a
wallet, or a purse.”41 And as for not analogizing computer searches to other
contexts, the Court declined to “import[] [constitutional standards] from the
vehicle context” to cellphones.42 It then also rejected “an analogue test” that
would allow the government to search photos on a cell phone just as it
could search photos in a wallet.43
Riley’s second notable contribution is how it determines the cell phone
search rule: by seeking equilibrium. Though this equilibrium-seeking is not

34 Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 872 (1995) (Fifth Amendment). See generally Kerr, supra note 1
(Fourth Amendment); Terzian, supra note 5 (Fifth Amendment).
35 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
36 See Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of-riley/
[http://perma.cc/Z72B-67G9].
37 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
38 Id. at 2489–91.
39 See id.
40 Id. at 2490.
41 Id. at 2488–89, 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
42 Id. at 2492.
43 Id. at 2493.
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explicit, it is nevertheless apparent.44 The Court noted that people carried
relatively little personal information on their person before cellphones
existed, so searches incident to arrest did not give the government much
evidence.45 Cellphones changed this. They contain immense amounts of
“quantitative and . . . qualitative” data about a person’s life,46 which make
an arrestee’s privacy interest in her cellphone “dwarf those in [her other
personal property at hand].”47 Moreover, allowing cellphones to be
searched would make it too easy for the government to obtain evidence,
because such searches “would typically expose to the government far more
than the most exhaustive search of a house.”48 At bottom, the Court’s
forbidding cellphone searches incident to arrest maintained equilibrium by
providing higher protections for cellphones than for other objects to help
restore the prior level of privacy protection.
III. FORCED DECRYPTION AS EQUILIBRIUM
Riley’s two principles illuminate the forced decryption issue. The
repeated assertions that computers are different—suggesting there should
be computer-specific criminal procedure rules—send a flare to lower
courts: Don’t “too quickly follow broad statements from pre-digital
opinions, even if those opinions emanated from the Supreme Court itself.”49
Instead, courts should “feel free to read Supreme Court precedents
narrowly” in the context of criminal procedure and new technologies.50 Just
as Riley rejected an analogue test to determine the constitutionality of cell
phone searches, lower courts should reject the same test to determine
whether forced decryption is constitutional. They need not inquire whether
forcing Julia to decrypt her hard drive is more like producing a safe
combination than a strongbox key. So even if the supposedly better
interpretation of predigital Fifth Amendment doctrine is that forced
decryption is forbidden, lower courts should instead—if there is good
reason to—adopt the possible interpretation that forced decryption is
permissible. And that good reason, Riley tells us, is maintaining
equilibrium.

44

See Kerr, supra note 36.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
46 Id. at 2489.
47 See id. at 2491 (bracketed phrase replacing reference to United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973), discussed in id. at 2483–84).
48 Id. at 2491 (emphasis omitted).
49 Re, supra note 9.
50 See id. (referring only to the Fourth Amendment).
45
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This is why courts should allow forced decryption: to maintain the
equilibrium between individual privacy and government power that Riley
also seeks to balance. Prior to encryption, the government obtained a
warrant and got the sought data. Even if the sought documents were held in
a safe and the government lacked the combination, the government still
obtained them because it could crack the safe.51
Also note that the government has a right to this data once it obtains a
warrant. As Riley recognized, the “answer to the question of what police
must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
accordingly simple—get a warrant.”52 Once the government obtains that
warrant—once it has probable cause to believe the cell phone contains
evidence that “will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction” for a
particular offense—privacy concerns cease, and the government has the
right search it.53 If the cell phone is unencrypted, the government then
obtains the data pursuant to that warrant.
But if the data lies on an encrypted device, equilibrium is disrupted.
Encryption can be virtually unbreakable, so the government cannot obtain
readable data without forced decryption. Even though the government has
the right to obtain this data with a warrant. Even though it would obtain this
data if it were not encrypted. And even though all data, encrypted or not, is
increasingly essential evidence.54 In short, encryption transforms the
government’s right to obtain this evidence into a person’s right to
essentially destroy evidence by making it inaccessible, a right
fundamentally counter to established jurisprudence.55 The only way to
restore the status quo—to return the government’s ability to obtain
evidence to its ex ante level—is through finding forced decryption
constitutional.
How, exactly, courts go about restoring equilibrium is a question of
line-drawing. Courts could say that forced decryption is always
constitutional because it is a nontestimonial act and that is all that matters.
51

Terzian, supra note 5, at 310.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
53 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2488, 2493–94, 2495; OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND
SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 72–76 (3d
ed. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/7LTGURC8] (explaining the process of obtaining a warrant for information stored on electronic storage
media).
54 See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 532 (2005)
(stating that “computers have become an increasingly important source of evidence” and searching
them is an increasingly “essential step in the investigation”).
55 Cf. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 816 (1984) (“The essence of the dissent is that there is
some ‘constitutional right’ to destroy evidence. This concept defies both logic and common sense.”).
52
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Or they could find that forced decryption is just sometimes constitutional,
only where maintaining equilibrium actually requires it. So if the
government cannot at all obtain the data without forced decryption, it is
constitutional; but if the government can easily obtain it (say, by getting the
password from the person’s spouse), forced decryption is not constitutional.
Elsewhere I have suggested a slight preference for the circumstantial
approach.56 But the absolute approach—that forced decryption is always
constitutional—has merit as well. Chiefly, it is easier in application, and
Riley rejects a circumstantial test in favor of an absolute ban on cell phone
searches incident to arrest.57 Wherever the line, it will likely be determined
just as it was in Riley: by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence seeks
equilibrium, and Riley calls for lower courts to seek it as well. Courts
interpreting the Fifth Amendment and whether it permits forced decryption
should therefore consider equilibrium. Permitting forced decryption
maintains the status quo; forbidding forced decryption destroys it. Because
Fifth Amendment doctrine can be interpreted as allowing forced decryption
and because doing so maintains equilibrium, courts should find forced
decryption constitutional.

56

Terzian, supra note 5, at 311–12.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491–92, 2494–95 (noting exigent circumstances that may permit a search
without a warrant).
57
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